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USURY AND LOAN TRANSFERS
Roger Bemhardt* & Alex Volkov**
Authors'Synopsis: This Article is primarily concerned with the effect of
transferring a mortgage loan from its originating loan broker to a
group of small investors when that loan was at its inception
usurious. However, because the rules applicable to that situation are
not confined to mortgage law, we begin with a general explanation of
usury rules before dealing with the particular real estate loan
transaction mentioned.
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I. SOME PRELIMINARY FEATURES OF USURY
Usury occurs when a lender has charged its borrower greater interest
than the applicable legal rules allow.' Regulation of maximum interest
rates is more or less a nationwide policy, although individual states set
* Roger Bernhardt is a Professor of Law of Golden Gate University and a former
chair of the Legal Education Committee of the Real Property Trusts and Estates Section
of the ABA.
** Aleksandr Volkov, J.D., graduated from Moscow State Academy of Law with his
J.D. and received his LL.M. from Golden Gate University. He currently practices law in
San Francisco and is a research assistant to Professor Bernhardt.
I See, e.g., Moncure v. Dermott, 38 U.S. 345, 356 (1839) (citing Barclay v.
Walmsley, (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 750 (K.B.); 4 East 54) ("There must be a loan, and the
taking of more than legal interest, or the forbearance of payment of a pre-existing debt,
upon a contract for illegal interest, to constitute usury.").
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different upper limits and often do so in different ways. 2 Some impose a
cap on all loan transactions, 3 whereas, at the other extreme, a few appear
to impose no limit whatsoever.4 In many jurisdictions, no comprehensive
and accurate description of their usury rules is possible because their
statutes or decisions are filled with too many distinctions-imposing rate
limits on some transactions while at the same time, letting other trans-
actions go unrestrained. 5 States commonly make these distinctions by
way of exemptions rather than definitions .
6
2See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (2013); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.050
(LexisNexis 2013).
3See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1 (imposing an 8% cap on all North Carolina
loans).
4See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.050; see also Income Tax Buyers, Inc. v.
Hamm, No. 91-CP-40-3193, 9004, 1992 WL 12092431, at *4 (S.C. C.P. Jan. 14, 1992)
("This Court is aware of [plaintiff]'s argument that South Carolina has no usury law. It
has no industrial loan law either."). Internationally, the United Kingdom has no usury
law, as is also true for the Philippines and most states in Australia. See Paul Hayeck, An
Economic Analysis of the Justifications of Usury Laws, 15 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 253,
256 (1996) (stating there are no anti-usury laws in the United Kingdom); Ponciano S.
Intal, Jr. & Gilberto M. Llanto, Financial Reform and Development in the Philippines,
1980-1997: Imperatives, Performance and Challenges, XXV J. PHILIPPINE DEV. 1, 15
(1998) (stating that in 1976 the Philippines Usury Act was abolished); Pierre Van Der
Eng, Consumer Credit in Australia During the Twentieth Century, 18 ACCT., Bus., & FIN.
HIST. 243, 248 (2008) (stating there are no anti-usury laws in Australia).
5See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-8-5 (LexisNexis 2002) (distinguishing between
transactions over or under $2,000); Carozza v. Fed. Fin. & Credit Co., 131 A. 332, 342
(Md. 1925) (distinguishing corporate borrowing from individual borrowing).
6 Transactions often declared exempt in many jurisdictions include:
- loans above a certain amount, see ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (LexisNexis
2012) (exempting loans under $25,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(B)
(2004) (exempting loans over $250,000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(2)(a)
(Supp. 2014); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 360.010(1)(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-1.1 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09(2)(d) (Supp. 2013)
(exempting loans over $35,000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1)
(LexisNexis 2012) (exempting loans over $100,000); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 82.010 (2013);
- loans for agricultural purposes over $25,000, see IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 535.2(2)(a)(5);
- loans for business purposes, see D.C. CODE § 28-3301(d)(1)(B) (2001);
- loans to non-profit or religious entities, see D.C. CODE § 28-3301(d)(1)(A), (D);
- loans to particular types of entities, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-14-09(2) (1999 & Supp. 2013);
secured loans, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-9(3) (2011) (exempting secured
loans above $5,000); D.C. CODE § 28-3301(d)(2) (exempting loans above
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A. The Logic of Exemptions
The discrepancy between the principle of imposing usury restrictions
on the one hand and then, on the other, of making exemptions to those
restrictions is probably the result of a natural tension that exists between
the often contrary positions that legislators and judges frequently hold as
to what is in the best interests of the borrowers. From one perspective,
imposing legal limits on interest rates is effective only under the assump-
tion that lenders will still continue to make loans and will obediently
lower their charges to bring them into compliance with what the law
permits. Whereas, contrarily, others fear that lenders will be deterred
from making loans at rates they perceive to be uneconomical, which
means that borrowers will be left without access to funds they may
desperately need.7 Rather than choosing one approach as appropriate in
all cases, many jurisdictions attempt to accommodate both sides of the
argument-imposing usury restrictions that may appear general but have
been eviscerated with numerous exemptions.
1. Federal Lenders
Some of these exemptions from usury restrictions are quite broad.
Federal lending institutions, for instance, are not subject to most state
restrictions. 8 Because that exemption occurs by federal override, the
Supremacy Clause assures that no states have rules to the contrary. 9 And
$1,000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(2)(a)(1), (3), (4); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
1. IA; OR. REV. STAT. § 82.025(3), (4);
- second mortgages, see VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-327 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 41a(b)(7) (2006).
7For instance, an interest rate cap of 10% would be decidedly unattractive to a
lender in an economy that was experiencing 20% inflation.
8The National Bank Act, "12 USC § 85 prohibits one state ... from overriding
interest rates that are lawful in the state where a national bank is based." Swanson v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 563 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). In general, state attempts to avoid
the federal protective envelope are unsuccessful: "'In any view that can be taken of
[§ 86], the power to supplement it by State legislation is conferred neither expressly nor
by implication."' Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (quoting
Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 29, 35 (1875)). "'Federal law.., completely
defines what constitutes the taking of usury by a national bank."' Id. (quoting Evans Nat'l
Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919)).
9See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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because such exempted national lenders are in actual competition with
local lenders, state legislatures feel a natural pressure to level the playing
fields and give their own locally regulated lending institutions similar
latitude, lest they go elsewhere or elect to become federally rather than
locally regulated.' 0 Equal protection concerns similarly restrict states'
abilities to regulate one class of lenders at the expense of another."
2. Time-price
Another common exception to usury restrictions is the rate that a
seller imposes on a buyer as a charge for her being permitted to pay the
purchase price in installments over time rather than immediately-the
"time-price differential." A few states do regulate those charges, 12 but
generally, a seller is deemed free to impose whatever charge she wants
for accepting delayed payment of an item, just as she was free to set the
original selling price for the item itself
3. Type ofLender
Other jurisdictions make further distinctions according to the type of
loan or type of borrower, some of which we have described in the
footnote below. 13 However, the most common forms of exemptions
10 For example, when the California Supreme court, in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), held that a due-on-sale clause in a deed of trust would
constitute an impermissible restraint on alienation if enforced automatically (that is,
without showing justification in each particular case), numerous institutional lenders in
California converted their state charters to federal charters in order to escape from that
doctrine. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 148-49
(1982). The issue took on sufficient importance as to lead Congress to enact the Gain
Act, permitting all lenders, whether state or federal, to enforce due on sale clauses. See
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 § 341, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3
(2012); Brushv. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 911 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
11See, e.g., Glenn v. State, 644 S.E.2d 826, 828 (Ga. 2007) (upholding a statute
criminalizing payday loans of under $3,000, when made by residents of the state, but not
when made by out-of-state banks).
12See, e.g., Clarkv. Aaron's, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1313-15 (N.D. Ga. 2012);
Bell v. Muller, 118 P.3d 405, 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
13For instance, Alabama exempts loans that are over $2,000. See ALA. CODE § 8-8-
5 (LexisNexis 2002). Connecticut exempts real property mortgage loans that are over
$5,000. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 37-9(3) (2013). North Dakota exempts loans "made to a
foreign or domestic corporation, foreign or domestic limited liability company, coopera-
tive corporation or association, or trust; ... [or] made to a partnership, limited
partnership, or association that files a state or federal partnership income tax return."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09(2)(b) & (c) (1993). Oregon exempts loans "from a tax
qualified retirement plan to a person then a participant under the plan." OR. REV. STAT.
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appear to be those based upon the type of lender making the loan. The
federal lender exemption has been already covered. 14 At the state level,
many specialized lenders, such as pawnbrokers, are exempted from the
State's general usury rules, because they often are subjected to more
particularized regulations 15 appearing elsewhere in the state's laws, orbecause they have been freed from all regulation.
II. CAN AN EXISTING LOAN BECOME USURIOUS?
In LFG National Capital v. Gary, Williams, Finney, Lewis, Watson,
& Sperando P.L. ,16 the original lender was LawFinance, a California
corporation, which loaned $10 million to a Florida law firm to finance
the firm's litigation, on a contingent fee basis, of major personal injury
and civil rights cases around the country. 17 The original interest rate for
the loans was the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 3% (for
a total of 16%), increasing the rate in cases of default by another 5% (to a
§ 82.025(6) (2013). Delaware exempts all loans made to corporate entities. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2306 (2013).
14 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
15For example, North Dakota exempts loans by "bona fide pawnbrok[ers]," on
loans under $10,000. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09(2)(a). Oregon excludes
pawnbrokers, OR. REv. STAT. § 82.025(1), and broker-dealers carrying debit balances for
their customers, OR. REv. STAT. § 82.025(8). The State of Washington has a reverse
1most favored lender" exemption for state-licensed depository institutions, allowing them
to have the same power and status as national banking associations. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 30.04.025 (2005). According to Miller and Starr, California provides 26 usury
exemptions for different types of lenders, including banks charted by the State of
California, another state, another nation, or by the United States; savings associations
chartered by the State of California, another state, or the Federal government; holding
companies or subsidiaries of an exempt institution; California insurance companies;
pension funds; licensed broker-dealers; business and industrial development corporations;
trust companies and trust departments of exempt banks; credit unions; industrial Loan
companies; pawnbrokers; personal property brokers, consumer finance lenders, and com-
mercial finance lenders; Veterans' Administration and Federal Housing Administration;
nonprofit cooperative associations; common interest development associations; medical
malpractice insurance cooperatives; college-level educational institutions; and California
state retirement systems. See HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE 3D, 21:35. Miller and Starr's list of exempt transactions (besides exempt
lenders) includes time price-differentials, shared appreciation loans, federally-related
home loans, business loans to sophisticated borrowers, retail installment contracts, and
corporate reorganizations. See id.
16 874 F. Supp. 2d 108 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
17 See id. at 112 (This loan was clearly not a real estate loan, but its terms would be
familiar to real estate borrowers and lenders, and its holding well fits real estate lending
transactions.).
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total of 210).18 Under California's general constitutional cap of 10% (or
5% over an index), 9 such rates would be usurious, 20 but LawFinance as a
"Finance Lender," was specially regulated, 21 and thus exempt from that
general limit.
Notwithstanding the lender's exempt status, the law firm borrower
still sought to defend on usury grounds, arguing that, three days after
having made the loan, LawFinance had assigned the loan to its affiliate
LFG National, a Delaware entity with its principal place of business in
Nevada.2 As either a Delaware entity or a Florida resident, the assignee,
LFG National Capital, was unlikely to qualify on its own for an
exemption in California.23 However, because the California constitution
provides that its usury laws do not apply "to persons authorized by
statute, or to any successor in interest to any loan or forbearance
exempted under this article,, 24 the defense failed.2 5 If the loan was not
usurious when made-because the original lender was exempt-then it
did not later become usurious when turned over to a nonexempt
transferee.26 To hold otherwise, opined the court, "would in effect
18 See id at 113.
19See CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1(2).
20 The loan documents included a California choice of law clause. See LFG Nat'l
Capital, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 113. In light of the fact that the lender was a California entity,
that provision was probably safe from attack, notwithstanding that the debtor was a
Florida entity and the UCC security filing was made in Florida. See id.
21 See CAL. FIN. CODE § 22002 (West 1999).
22 See LFG Natl Capital, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 112. Had this loan been subject to the
laws of Florida, Delaware, or Nevada, it probably would have still survived. In Florida,
the interest rate limit is 25% for loans over $500,000. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 687.02,
687.071 (West 2003). In Delaware, there is no interest rate limit on loans of $100,000, so
long as they are not secured by the borrower's principal residence. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 2301(c) (2013). And Nevada imposes no limit on rates. See NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 99.050 (2013). Conversely, had the loan been deemed usurious, in either
California or Florida, the borrower would not owe any interest at all to the lender. See
also DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 43.19 (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 2014).
23 See LFG Nat'l Capital, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 112. Another entity involved in the
transaction was "LFG Servicing," but its status with respect to usury was not discussed.
See id. at 124-25.
24 CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
25 See LFG Natl Capital, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 125.
26 See id
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prohibit-make uneconomic-the assignment or sale by banks of their
commercial property to a secondary market."
2 7
The principle that a successful defense against a usury charge is not
jeopardized because the loan was transferred by an exempt lender to a
nonexempt one appears widely accepted. And the circumstances of the
transfer are not likely to affect the status of the loan as far as usury is
concerned. The fact that the transferee purchased the loan at a large
enough discount to make its effective return exceed a usury cap (if it had
been originated as a new loan between payor and transferee) generally
does not work as a defense 8 Indeed, bond markets would undergo
serious shock if discount and premium prices could not be altered con-
stantly as market conditions change. Similarly, buyers who purchase
time-price obligations from sellers clearly lack the exempt status of their
transferors, but not the exempt status of the paper they have purchased.29
(While there is some momentum towards restricting the recovery of
purchasers of defaulted residential mortgages,3 ° that is in the nature of
anti-deficiency rather than usury protection).
On the other hand, when the original reason for holding a loan not
usurious was the exempt status of the lender, as opposed to its low
interest rate, the doctrine of successor protection does not always apply
with the same force. The nominal first lender may have been merely a
front for the real, second lender-who used its "nominee" solely to avoid
having to comply with the requirements the jurisdiction imposed as a
condition for obtaining such exemption.3 1 In California, a loan secured
27 Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 687.04(1) (West 2003) (providing that "the penalties
provided for by this section shall not apply: (1) To a bona fide endorsee or transferee of
negotiable paper purchased before maturity, unless the usurious character should appear
upon its face, or unless the said endorsee or transferee shall have had actual notice of the
same before the purchase of such paper"). In California, Miller and Starr say: "If the loan
is exempt but is acquired after origination by a person who was not a party to a pre-
arranged credit and assignment transaction, the loan should remain exempt." MILLER &
STARR, supra note 15, 21:35 n. 1.
28 See, e.g., Milana v. Credit Disc. Co., 163 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 1944); Moe v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
29 See, e.g., Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 883 P.2d 960, 968 (Cal. 1994); see also DCM
Partners v. Smith, 228 Cal. App. 3d 729, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (changing terms of
exempt transaction does not affect the exemption).
30See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.430, 40.455, 645F.430, 6451.440 (2014); see
also Lavi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 325 P.3d 1265, 1276 (Nev. 2014); Schleining v.
Cap One, Inc., 326 P.3d 4, 6 (Nev. 2014).
31 Indeed, the loan sale by Law Finance occurred only three days after the loan was
made, and the sale was to a related entity. See LFG Nat'l Capital, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
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by real estate that was "made or arranged" by a real estate broker is
statutorily exempt from the state's usury laws,32 a situation that has
inevitably tempted lenders to use brokers as fronts in their real estate
lending activities.
33
III. GOING FROM USURY TO NONUSURY
The converse side of the question-whether a loan that was initially
usurious may end up not being subject to attack-can sometimes be easy
to dispose of Two common situations illustrate this situation.
A. Transfer of the Loan Collateral
Where a loan is secured by real estate (or personal property), it is not
uncommon to see the mortgaged land transferred to a new owner before
the loan is paid off If the loan was initially usurious, the new owner of
the property may be tempted to assert that defect as a defense against the
lender. Unfortunately for the new owner, that defense is almost never
SUCCeSSfUl.
34
The general statement of the courts in rejecting a usury contention
made by a subsequent owner of the property encumbered by the tainted
loan is that usury is a "personal" defense, which can be asserted only by
the original borrower.35 A more intelligent and useful explanation is that
if the purchaser of the property has deducted the balance of the mortgage
debt from the acquisition price she had to pay, then she cannot "have
[her] cake and eat it too., 3 6 To the grantee, the mortgage was not a
32 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1916.1 (West 2010).
33The nile also forces California judges to decide just how much effort and involve-
ment a real estate broker must have invested in a transaction to justify the lender's claim
that the loan was made or arranged by the broker rather than the lender. See, e.g., Bock v.
Cal. Capital Loans, Inc., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Gibbo v.
Barger, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 833-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
34 See, e.g., De Wolfv. Johnson, 23 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1825).
35Id. at 393; see also Call v. Palmer, 116 U.S. 98, 103 (1885); In re Worth, 130 F.
927, 930 (N.D. Iowa 1904); Boyett v. Rutland Sav. Bank, 116 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938); Cont'l Assurance Co. v. Gibner, 119 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 74 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
36 Nortonv. Commerce Trust Co., 71 F.2d 136, 136 (5th Cir. 1934); see also Ames
v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 291 P.182, 183 (Cal. 1930). Although courts often state the
nile as applicable to a grantee who has "assumed" the mortgage, the explanation equally
well suits the purchaser who took "subject" to the mortgage, so long as the mortgage debt
was subtracted from the price that had to be paid. The nile may not fit the situation in
which the grantee agreed only to assume the amount "legally due."
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promise to pay interest to the lender, but rather a required flat sum
payment to the grantor's lender as part of the purchase price,3 7 making it
look more like a time-pice differential than a loan. 38 For rather similar
reasons, a borrower who has already lost his property on foreclosure
cannot make a usury claim against the foreclosure purchaser.3 9
B. Transfer of Negotiable Paper
If the loan was embodied in a negotiable instrument that had thereafter
been negotiated to a holder in due course, Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) generally gives the transferee a defense against
claims of usury.40 When a note is negotiable, UCC section 3-305(b)
provides that the only valid defenses against a holder in due course are the
"real" ones enumerated in section 3-305(a)(1); other defenses are cut off
against a holder in due course by virtue of section 3-305(a)(2). 4 Usury is
usually an "other" defense.42 While there are some exceptions to section 3-
43305 in section 3-306, they do not relate to usury.
C. Transfers to Nonholders in Due Course
This leaves hanging the more difficult question of what to do when
the transferee of the loan does not qualify as a holder in due course,
either because the original note was not a negotiable instrument, or
because its transfer was not a proper negotiation.
That predicament-a "bad" note transferred to a "good" person-was
recently illustrated in Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates,44
a California appellate decision. In that case, the plaintiffs borrowed $2
million to finance their real estate ventures.45 Their loans were at only 10%
interest, the California maximum, but the loan broker added his
commission to the interest rate, bringing the effective rate up to 16%.46
37See Norton, 71 F.2d at 136.
38See W. Coast Builders, Inc. v. Pac. States Auxiliary Corp., 18 P.2d 71, 72 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
39See Edgell v. Ham, 93 F. 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1899).
40 See U.C.C. § 3-305 (amended 2002), 2 U.L.A. 155 (2004).
41 See id
42 See Robinsonv. Rudy, 666 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. App. 1983).
43 See, e.g., Thompkins v. Mortg. Lenders Network USA, Inc., 61 A.3d 829, 836
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013).
44 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
45See id. at 569.
46 See id
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This 16% charge was not originally thought to be usurious because
of the California exemption for loans "made or arranged by any person
licensed as a real estate broker,, 47 described earlier. Everyone simply
assumed that this transaction came under the broker arranged loan
exemption.
48
The problem was that the broker had allowed his corporate license to
lapse. 49 Although his individual license was still in good standing, he
handled these loans through his corporation-the unlicensed entity.
50
This blunder meant that the broker arranged loan exemption did not
apply and, therefore, the total charge of 16% was usurious.5'
This fact was not discovered by the borrowers until after they had
fully repaid the loans, but upon discovery they sued to recover all the
interest they paid, as California usury law permits.
52
What makes the appellate opinion affirming the borrowers' recovery
notable is that the 54 individuals who advanced small sums ($25,000 to
$50,000) to the loan broker to generate a large enough amount to handle
the borrower's financing needs were joined as defendants in the action.53
These individuals had been paid returns on their advances, but not at
47 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.1 (West 2010).
48 See Creative Ventures, LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570. More technically, the loans
should probably have been characterized as broker "made," rather than "arranged,"
because the funds came from numerous small private investors who had advanced them
to the broker, who then loaned them (himself) to the borrowers. See id. at 569.
See id at 570.
50 See id. at 573.
See id
52 California allows borrowers in usurious transactions to recover all unlawful
interest paid. See White v. Seitzman, 41 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). It
also permits them sometimes to recover treble interest. See Heald v. Friis-Hansen, 345
P.2d 457, 462 (Cal. 1959). Treble interest was denied by the trial court in Creative
Ventures, on the ground that the overcharge was not malicious. See 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
579-80. The United States Supreme Court said, in 1836:
[H]e who seeks the aid of equity to be delivered from usury, must do
equity by paying the principal and legal interest upon the money
borrowed.... This is essential to every such application in a court of
equity: first, to give the court jurisdiction; and to enable the chancellor,
if he thinks proper to do so, to require the payment of principal and
interest before the hearing of the cause. The relief sought in such cases
is an exemption from the illegal usury.
Stanley v. Gadsby, 35 U.S. 521, 522 (1836). But probably nothing stops a legislature
from changing that rule and converting a usurious loan into an interest free one.
53See Creative Ventures, LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 568.
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usurious rates. 54 In fact, they knew nothing about the transaction or about
its usurious features.55 Should they have to forfeit the "legitimate"
interest that they had received?
The trial court reasoned that the investors should not have to refund
the interest payments they received, because the investors were holders
in due course, protected under UCC section 3-305.56 But the court of
appeals concluded that such characterization of the investors was
impossible because the notes had not been endorsed to them and they did
not hold the notes.57
The notes were originally made payable 'to the order of JIM WARD
& ASSOCIATES (the 'Holder,' which term shall include all assignees of
this Note.)"' 58 In the lawsuit, the parties agreed that the notes were
negotiable instruments-a characterization that might be challenged in
light of the many other cluttering provisions included in the notes.59
In finding the trial court's ruling to be incorrect, the court of appeals
reasoned:
Investors might have become holders had JWA negotiated
the notes by indorsing and transferring possession to
Investors. (Com. Code, § 3201.) But negotiation does not
take place, and the transferee does acquire the rights of a
holder, unless the instrument is indorsed. (Id. § 3203,
subd. (c).) It follows that, since there is no evidence that
JWA negotiated the promissory notes by endorsement and
60delivery, Investors cannot be holders in due course.
Instead of negotiating and transferring the notes to the investors,
JWA, pursuant to the loan servicing agreements with the investors,
retained possession of the notes, collected the payments, and remitted
appropriate shares of the proceeds to the investors. 6 1 Under such circum-
62stances, they could not be treated as endorsees or holders of the notes.
54See id at 578.
55See id. at 579.
56 See id at 575.
57See id. at 577-78.
58 Id. at 569 (quoting the promissory note contained within the court record).
59See id at 575.
6 0 Id. at 576.
61 See id. at 569.
62 See id at 575.
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Even if the possession (holder) issue could be dodged, by saying that
JWA held the notes as agent of the investors (thus, the notes were
constructively held by the investors themselves), the notes could not
have been endorsed to the investors, which is a necessary step to allow
the investors to claim holder in due course status.63
Holder in due course status makes an enormous difference. Had the
investors been holders in due course, they would have held the notes free
of any defense of usury, as noted earlier. But given the loan servicing
arrangement, the investors were not holders in due course, they were
64merely common law assignees of the notes. As assignees, they were
entitled to enforce the obligations assigned to them, but those collection
rights were subject to whatever defenses the obligors had against their
assignor. 65 The investors may have made no usurious profit on their
investments, but that did not mean that the rights assigned to them were
free of the original taint of usury generated by the unlicensed status of
the transferor.66 So the investors lost all the interest they had received.67
It seems easier to feel sorry for the innocent investors 68-who lost all
interest-than for the sophisticated borrowers, who ended up receiving
interest-free money as the result of a licensing fumble by the inter-
mediary loan broker (who had been retained by the borrowers to get the
funds). But if usury is to be treated as a legitimate defense for borrowers,
and if appropriate sanctions are to include recovery of all interest paid,
then the result was "correct," and will likely be followed in similar situa-
tions. This conclusion means that attorneys whose clients invest their
savings in fractional shares of larger mortgage loans must warn clients of
the risk that they may lack any holder in due course defenses if the loans
turn out to be legally problematic. And attorneys whose clients make,
sell, or service such loans for investors should devise arrangements that
will allow their clients to guaranty their investors that all such risks have
been eliminated.
63 See id. at 576.
64 See id. at 577.
65 See id
66 Two of the investors testified that they received, respectively, eight and ten
percent interest on their loans. See id. at 570.
67 See id at 568.
68 Who were probably mainly retirees.
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IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM
Solutions should not be impossible to find. To have the protection
that they needed, the investors in Creative Ventures69 needed to be
sheltered by the holder in due course doctrine; indeed, that is what the
law of negotiable instruments is all about. The loans they invested in
needed to be represented by negotiable notes that had been properly
negotiated-to them or to someone fronting for them. This was a lesson
Wall Street taught a few decades ago when it began to securitize
individual mortgage notes into pools held by special purpose entities,
which were then redivided into tranches and sold to investors by way of
certificates that were defense free.70 Consequently, many of those
teachings of how loans were securitized should be useful for the Creative
Ventures71 financer.72 First, the note must be negotiable when it is
initially executed and it must be order or bearer paper. While an original
payee may be able to qualify as a holder in due course, 73 transferee status
is a safer alternative, meaning that the ultimate investors should not be
named in the original note itself Investors should also proceed with
caution to ensure that other provisions of the note do not impair its nego-
tiability.74 Second, the note should be endorsed, rather than assigned, to
the investors.75 The final step-the one that the Creative Ventures76
69 See Creative Ventures, LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 568.
70 See generally Timothy J. Riddiough, Can Securitization Work? Economic,
Structural, and Policy Considerations (June 2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/CFR/mortgage futurehouse finance/papers/riddiough.pdf (outlining the
modifications necessary to securitize underlying loan-securities).
71 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
72 While the securitization episode may have ultimately come to a disastrous
conclusion, that was because too many of the mortgages in the pools were trash, or
because the sponsors of those pools had been too rushed to comply with the formalities
mandated by their pooling agreements, not because the investors failed to qualify for
holder in due course protection.
73 See U.C.C. § 3-302, note 4 (amended 2002), 2 U.L.A. 155 (2004).
74See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary
Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 737, 739-40 (2010).
75See U.C.C. § 3-201 (amended 2002), 2 U.L.A. 102. This step is unnecessary if the
notes are bearer paper. See id. "If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated
by transfer of possession alone." Id. § 3-201(b), 2 U.L.A. 102. If the bank issues a
cashier's check to the Buyer, the Buyer must endorse the check to the Seller during the
sale. However, if the check is made payable to the Seller the Buyer is simply a "remitter"
of the check and his endorsement is not required to facilitate the sale. See id. § 3-201,
cmt. 2, 2 U.L.A. 102.
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financer failed to take-is to have the notes delivered to a proper
"holder." It may have made sense for the financer to physically retain the
notes, given that there were numerous investors for each note and that to
be able to service the loans it was technically required to exhibit the
appropriate note to the payors to collect the payments due on it. As there
was only one note, it could not give each investor a genuine copy of the
original note, nor could it tear up those single pieces of paper into fifty-
three little pieces. But a comprehensive agency and servicing agreement
could solve this issue.
What the financer should have learned from Wall Street was that the
notes could be delivered to a third person-probably an entity of some
kind, preferably bankruptcy remote, who would qualify for holder in due
course status, and thus be able to hold the notes free of the risk that they
would later be subject to any usury defense.
The investors should also not have been given fractional interests in
the notes-another feature that made it impossible for them to assert
holder in due course status for themselves 77 -instead, they should have
been given fractional interests in the entity that did hold the notes and
had holder in due course status. Such a strategy should not be difficult to
follow. We have long enabled individuals to form a group and then
empowered the group to collectively exercise the rights previously held
individually.78 If the Creative Ventures79 financer wanted to fully insulate
its investors, it should have done what the secondary market has learned
to do in the last few decades for its investors.
76 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
77Under U.C.C. section 3-203(d), a note is negotiated only if the entire instrument
is transferred to the transferee. See U.C.C. § 3-203(d) (amended 2002), 2 U.L.A. 106
(2004). So fractional transfers of the notes to the investors, even if there had been proper
endorsements, would not have worked. The Official Comment to U.C.C. section 3-203
states:
The cause of action on an instrument cannot be split. Any endorsement
which purports to convey to any party less than the entire amount of
the instrument is not effective for negotiation. This is true of either
"Pay A one-half," or "Pay A two-thirds and B one-third." Neither A
nor B becomes a holder. On the other hand an endorsement reading
merely "Pay A and B" is effective, since it transfers the entire cause of
action to A and B as tenants in common.
U.C.C. § 3-203, cmt. 5, 2 U.L.A. 108. The last sentence of this comment does suggest
that the investors might be protected if they held their shares of the notes as tenants in
common, but that appears as an awkward and clumsy alternative. See id.
78 Thus we have trusts, corporations, partnerships, LLCs.
79 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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V. CONCLUSION
There are serious risks for persons who purchase participating
interests in larger loans, because the structure of those arrangements
likely fails to give them holder in due course protection against usury
claims. Counsel for both the original lender and the later loan
participants must watch closely to assure that those risks have been
minimized.
